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duced thereby. Appellees have no right to go upon the right of
way and dig ditches and construct bridges or culverts, nor can they
be required to do so by appellant. If, however, appellant has constructed obstructions on appellee's land, then they may remove the
same, and the jury may consider what would be the cost, and if
that would restore the property to its former condition, that would
be the depreciation in the value of their land; but if appellant has
created such obstructions on its own land, appellees and the jury
have the right to regard them as'permanent, and the one has the
right to claim it as a permanent injury, and the other to allow damages as s.uch."
This decision is valuable for its assertion of the plaintiff's rightto
remove obstructions from his land, as an incident of ownership.
Within the limits here indicated, the cost of removal would seem a
proper element of damages. The structure should be removable in
fact. It should be upon the plaintiff's property and within his
power to remove at his option, and the cost of- removal should be
reasonablein proportion to the value of the property. All these,
like the question of permanency, are questions of fact. The difficulties all spring from the lack of a complete understanding of the
facts.
In fine, the uncertainties of the rule as to future damages are like
the uncertainties as to all things future, uncertainties of fact, and
in applying the rules of law to torts causing such damages the first
step is to classify the tort.
MERRITT STARR.

Chicago.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
LEWIS v. NEW YORK CENT. SLEEPING-CAR COMPANY.
A sleeping-car company is bound to use reasonable care to guard a passenger on
its cars from theft ; and if, through want of such care, the personal effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably carry with him, are stolen,'the company is liable.
The fact that the company has posted a notice in its cars, in which it disclaims liability for the loss of valuables by passengers, is not available by way of defence to
an action by a passenger whose money, which he bad placed beneath the pillow in
his berth on going to sleep, was stolen, where it appears that the passenger did not
see or know of such notice.
In an action against a sleeping-car company by a passenger, for money stolen
from his berth while he was asleep, the factthat another passenger lost a sum of
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7noney in a similar manner at the same time is itself some evidence of the want of
proper watehful'ess by the porter of the car; and where there was evidence that the
porter was found asleep in the early morning, and that he was required to be on
duty for thirty-six hours continuously, which included two nights, a case is presented
which must be submitted to the jury to determine whether or not there was negligence on the part of the company in guarding its passengers.

THESE were two actions, each with a count in contract and tort.
The count in contract alleged that the defendant, in consideration
of the purchase by the plaintiff of a ticket which entitled him to
be carried in a sleeping car of the defendant from Albany to Buffalo, undertook to provide plaintiff a berth in said sleeping-car, and
to see that said car was properly guarded, and that his personal
baggage and effects were protected while he was asleep, but that,
while plaintiff was riding in said car, through the negligence of the
defendant's servant who was employed by them to care for and
watch said car, and protect the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers riding therein, the plaintiff's pocket book, and a large
sum of money therein, was taken from his person by some person
unknown, so that he wholly lost the same. The count in tort
alleged the same facts, and claimed damages for the property stolen.
At the trial in the Superior Court, before THomPsoN, J., it was
agreed that the defendant owned and managed a certain sleepingcar, to wit, the car Pontiac, which was run on the Boston & Albany
Railroad and on the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad.
William Lewis, one of the plaintiffs, testified: "I left Boston
for San Francisco, October 20th 1884, on the train leaving the
Boston and Albany depot at six P.3i. This was a regular train,
leaving Boston daily, with passengers, bound for San Francisco.
I bought sleeping-car tickets of the defendant's agent in the depot
at Boston, entitling me to two berths, or one section, in the car
Pontiac, between Boston and Chicago, paying $11 for the same. I
occupied the whole section, going to bed about eleven o'clock. I
took off only my coat, vest and boots. I folded my vest up, and
put it under my pillow, right under my head. In the inside pocket
of the vest I had $200 in bills. The pocket was sewed up securely
across the top before I left home. I had sewed it up so that it
might be safe when I went to sleep. I felt the money in the pocket
of the vest before I went to sleep, which was after leaving Albany,
at about half-past one in the morning. I did not wake until five
o'clock, when I got up and dressed, putting on my vest. I then
went to the wash-room. The train conductor was there. I next

LEWIS v. N. Y. CENT. SLEEPING-CAR CO.

went into the smoking-room at the end of the car. It was so situated that you cannot see the main body of the car from it. When
I entered the smoking-room I. found the porter there. He was
lying down, with his body and head on a short seat, and his feet
on the floor, with a blanket rolled over him. I think he was asleep.
From the position where he was, no view was to be had of the part
of the car where the passengers were asleep. About 5.30, Mr.
Wing [the other plaintiff] came into the smoking-room, and said
he had been robbed. I examined my vest. I discovered that a
slit two or three inches long had been cut in the bottom of the
pocket, and all the money taken out. When I discovered the loss,
I told the porter about it. He said it must have been a man who
got off at a place where we stopped at about four o'clock, because
the man gave him five dollars. At a stopping place I told the
sleeping-car conductor, who called an official. I told the official I
found the fellow asleep. The porter said that he was not asleep,
because he talked to the train conductor just before I found him in
the smoking-room. I did not see any notice in the wash-room in
which the company disclaims responsibility for personal property
in berths. It was not light enough in the wash-room for me to
read it if I had seen it. I never saw such notices in sleeping-cars.
I have frequently travelled on this route to San Francisco-two or
fbur times a year for ten years-taking a sleeping-car each time."
William R. Wing, the other plaintiff, testified that he put his
money, when he went to sleep, in the interior compartment of a
pocket-book, and put the pocket-book in the inside pocket of his
vest, which he put under his pillow; that when he woke up, the
money was gone; and that he did not remember seeing any notice
in the wash-room in regard to valuables.
It was agreed that (except at stations where the door was locked)
the doors at both ends of the car were kept unlocked, and there
was no interruption to its passage from one end of the train to the
other.
Nathan A. Wheeler, for the defendant, testified that he was
eastern division superintendent of the defendant company; that the
price charged to everybody on sleeping-cars is the same for the
same accommodations ; and that no consideration is made in the
price in view of the articles or money or valuables which a passenger has.
William F. Ray, conductor of the car Pontiac, testified that he
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took charge of the car at Albany; that the porter is on duty from
Boston to Chicago ; that the duties of the porter are to look after
the car and his passengers, black boots and to stay awake; that
there were notices about responsibility for valuables at each end of
the car, in the gentlemen's and ladies' wash-rooms, directly over
the wash-stand ; and that the porter's pay is $25 a month, he finding
his own board.
It was admitted by the defendant that there was no receptacle for
valuables or other property furnished by the defendant, and that
its servants are forbidden to take possession of any such articles.
This comprised all the material evidence, and at its close the
defendant's counsel asked for certain rulings, as follows: (1) That
there is no evidence upon which the jury can find any contract or
obligation on the part of the defendant to watch and care for or
protect the money of the plaintiff; (2) that there is no evidence
upon which the jury can find that the loss occurred through the
negligence of the defendant; (3)that the absence of the porter
from the aisle of the car, as testified to by Lewis, is the only evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant; and that evidence
is not sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff, the absence
being after the loss occurred.
The court refused so to rule, but instructed the jury as follows:
That "the defendant corporation, in furnishing sleeping-cars for
the travelling public, is not to be regarded as an innkeeper, or as a
common carrier. Those are insurers of the property. But it is
bound to exercise care to prevent thefts of goods and money from
the person of one to whom it has furnished a berth for. hire in the
ordinary course of its business, either from unauthorized intruders
or by occupants of the car. The company may be liable for such
articles as a passenger usually carries about his person,, and for
such sum of money as may be reasonable and necessary for travelling expenses, providing the same is lost by want of ordinary care
on the part of the defendant, or its servants in not exercising such
care."
Upon the question of whether the evidence tended to show negligence on the part of the defendant which would justify the jury in
finding that the loss occurred through the negligence of the defendant the court instructed the jury as follows: "You are to say,
under all the circumstances of this case, whether or not the defendant corporation, on the night in question, in the sleeping-car Pon-
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tiac, exercised ordinary care to protect the persons occupying the
berths there from larceny. You will determine what, under the
circumstances, would be ordinary care,-not extraordinary care,not to keep such a condition of things as to render it impossible for
a theft to occur,-but taking into consideration the business, the
construction of the car, the situation of the berths ; and on all the
facts you are to say what would be reasonable care. If you find
thaB the defendant did exercise ordinary care, then it is not responsible to the plaintiffs, or either of 'them. If you find that defendant
did not exercise ordinary care, then you will go further, and ascertain whether the theft was the result of the want of such ordinary
care. If you find it was the result of the want of ordinary care
on the part of the defendant, and the plaintiffs were themselves in
the exercise of due care, then the defendant would be answerable
for the whole, or such part of the money lost as it was reasonable
and necessary for these parties to have, taking them as travellers
upon the journey that they were going, and having regard to the
ordinary liabilities and expenses contingent upon such a trip."
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in each case, and
the defendant alleged exceptions.
. Clifford, W. Olifford and H. Hf. Crapo, for defendant.
H. J. Knowlton and A. E. Perry, for plaintiffs.
C.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MoRToN, C. J.-The use of sleeping cars upon railroads is modern, and there are few adjudicated cases as to the extent of the
duties and liabilities of the owners of such cars. They must be
ascertained by applying to the new condition of things, the comprehensive and elastic principles of the common law. When a person
buys the right to the use of a berth in a sleeping-car, it is entirely
clear that the ticket which he receives is not intended to and does
not express all the terms of the contract into which he enters. Such
ticket, like the ordinary railroad ticket, is little more than a symbol
intended to show to the agents in charge of the car that the possessor has entered into a contract with the company owning the car,
by which he is entitled to passage in the car named on the ticket.
Ordinarily, the only communication between the parties is that the
passenger buys, and the agent of the car company sells a ticket
between two points ; but the contract thereby entered into is implied
from the nature and usages of the employment of the company.
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A sleeping-car company holds itself out to the world as furnishing
safe and comfortable cars; and, when it sells a ticket, it impliedly
stipulates to do so. It invites passengers to pay for and make use
of its cars for sleeping ; all parties knowing that, during the greater
part of the night, the passenger will be asleep, powerless to protect
himself, or to guard his property. He cannot, like the guest of an
inn, by locking the door, guard against danger. He has no right
to take any such steps to protect himself in a sleeping-car, but, by
the necessity of the case, is dependent upon the owners and officers
of the ca" to guard him and the property he has with him from
danger from thieves or otherwise.
The law raises the duty on the part of the car company to afford
him this protection. While it is not liable as a common carrier or
as an innholder, yet it is its clear duty to use reasonable care to
guard the passengers from theft; and if, through want of such care,
the personal effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably
carry with him, are stolen, the company is liable for it. Such a rule
is required by public policy and by the true interests of both the
passenger and the company; and the decided weight of authority
supports it. Woodruff S., &c., C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474;
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. 78; Same v.
Gaylord, 23 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 788.
The notice by which the defendant company sought to avoid its
liability was not known to the plaintiff, and cannot avail the
defendant.
The defendant contends that there was no evidence of negligence
on its part. The fact that two larcenies were committed in the
manner described in the testimony is itself some evidence of the
want of proper watchfulness by the porter of the car. Add to this
the testimony that the porter was found asleep in the early morning,
that he was required to be on duty for thirty-six hours continuously,
which includes two nights-and a case is presented which must be
submitted to the jury.
We have considered all the questions which have been argued in
the two cases before us, and are of opinion that the rulings at the
trial were correct.
Exceptions overruled.
It appears to be well settled that sleep-

ing-car companies are to be regarded
neither as innkeepers nor common car-

riers, and hence are not subject to the

onerous liabilities of either in respect to
the property of those enjoying their ac-
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commodations: Darganv. Pullman Palace Car Co., 2 Wilson (Tex. Ct. of App.
Civ. Cas.) 607; Blum v. &outhern Pullman Palace Car Co., 3 Cent. L. J. 591;
s. c. 1 Flip. 500; Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Gaylord, 23 Am. L. leg. (N.S.)
788; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith,
73 Ill. 360 ; Welch T. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 352;
s. o. I Sheld. (N. Y. Super. Ct.) 457;
Palmeter v. Wagner, II Alb. L. J. 149;
Thompson on Carriers, p. 530, 20.
It is, however, Pqually well settled that
it is the duty of such companies to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the
security of the property of their passengers ; and what is ordinary care must be
measured with reference to the danger
reasonably to be apprehended. Such
danger is greater at night while the passenger is asleep than in the day time when
he is awake and can care for himself.
The invitation to make use of a berth
carries with it an invitation to sleep and
an implied agreement to take reasonable
care of the passenger's effects while he is
asleep; a failure to use ordinary care
proportionate to the danger reasonably to
be apprehended, would be such negligence as would ordinarily render such a
company liable for the loss of the passenger's property. The gist, therefore, of the
liability of such a company is negligence:
Dargan v. Pullman Palace Car Co., supra; Pfadzer v. Pullman Palace Car
Co., 4 Weekly Notes Cases 240; Palmeter v. Wagner, 11 Alb. L. T. 149 ;
Blum v. Southern Pullman Palace Car
Co., 3 Cent. L. J. 591 ; Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Gaylord, 23 Am. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 788 ; Keith v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 17 Chic. L. News 196; Woodruff Sleeping and Parlor Coach Co. v.
Die/l, 84 Ind, 474; Thompson on Carriers, p. 530, 20.

Such liability will extend to the loss
of such articles as a passenger usually
carries about his person, and such sum
of money as may be reasonably necessary
for his travelling expenses: Blum v.
Southern Pullman Palace Car Co., .supra;
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gaylord, 23
Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 788 (a diamond
scarf pin worth $300) ; Woodruff Sleeping and Parlor Coach Co. v. Diehl, 84
Ind. 474.
The fact, however, that the palace car
company is not liable as a common carrier does not relieve the railway company
from which the passenger purchased his
ticket from its usual common-law liability. In the case of L.4N. G.S.
Rd. v. Katzenberger, 1 S. W. Rep. 44,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that the liability of the railway company
to the passenger continues even when the
passenger takes his baggage into a sleeping-car and gives it into the charge of the
porter thereof; and that a railway company cannot limit its liability by any
specil arrangement with the sleeping-car
company, because so long as the sleeper
forms part of the train, negligence on
the part of the sleeping-car agents is the
negligence of the railway company running the train. To the same effect see
Kinsley v. Lake Shore, 4-c., Rd., 125
Mass. 54.
The ground of liability of a sleepingcar company being, as we have seen
above, negligence, there would seem to
be no doubt as to the correctness of
the decision of the court in the principal
case. In that case the evidence of negligence seems to be entirely sufficient to
sustain the verdict of the jury.
xAlsia&r D. EwELL.
Chicago.

WHITNEY v. PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO.

Supreme Court of lassachusetts.
WHITNEY v. PULLMAN PALACE CAR COMPANY.
The plaintiff who had purchased a ticket to ride in a day parlor car of the defendant company, had in her possession and kept under her personal control a small
reticule containing valuables. On reaching the station at Portsmouth she, with
her husband, left the car for refreshments, leaving the reticule upon the window
sill of the car, from which it was stolen: Held, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in the care of her property, and hence that the defendant was not liable for
the loss.

PLAINTIFF, with her husband, purchased from defendant, tickets
entitling them to seats in one of defendant's parlor cars, from
Boston to the White Mountains. They occupied seats near the
rear end of the car. Opposite, or along the side of each of such
seats, was a small window, and betweenm such seats was a large
window. There was a parlor car conductor in charge of the car,
but no porter on the car.
Plaintiff had in her possession a small satchel or reticule, which
it was claimed, contained jewelry, &c., of the value of about $700.
When the train arrived at Portsmouth, the parlor car conductor
announced a stop of ten minutes for refreshments. Plaintiff placed
her small satchel or reticule, containing Her jewelry, &c., on the
window sill against the glass of the large window, which was closed;
one of the small windows being closed and the other being open.
Plaintiff and her husband, leaving the satchel or reticule in the
large window, went to the lunch room. When they returned to
the car the satchel or reticule was gone. There were other railroad
passengers in the car occupying seats directly opposite the seats
occupied by plaintiff and her husband. It was possible for a person
outside of the car standing upon the platform, to have obtained the
satchel or reticule by reaching in through the small window, which
was open.
The parlor car conductor had left the car and was also in the
lunch room at the same time that plaintiff and her husband were
there, and was not in the car when plaintiff and her husban6L
returned to the same.
The court below held that plaintiff could not recover.
MORTON, C. J.-The plaintiff bought of the Eastern Railroad
Company a ticket which entitled her to ride from Boston to the
White Mountains in a day parlor car owned by the defendant and
in use by the Eastern Railroad Company under a contract with the
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defendant. She had with her a satchel or reticule, which she did
not deliver to the defendant or any of its agents, but which she
kept in her personal control. There was evidence tending to show
that it was stolen while the train was stopping in Portsmouth for
refreshments. It is clear that she cannot hold the defendant liable
as a common carrier. She can only hold it liable upon the ground
that her property was lost by some negligence of the defendant and
'without any fault on her part: Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275;
.Kinsley v. Lake Shore Rd., 125 Id. 54.
We are of opinion that upon the evidence the plaintiff fails to
show due care on her part.
When the train stopped at Portsmouth, she and her husband left
the car for ten minutes, leaving her reticule upon the sill of one of
the car windows, a conspicuous and exposed place, which could be
reached from the outside through an adjoining window, which was
open. This was not evidence of common prudence or proper care
of her property, and thus her own negligence contributed to the
loss. This is decisive against her right to recover, and we need not
consider the question whether there is any evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendent. Nor is it necessary to consider
whether the liability of the defendant is different from that of a
railroad using its own cars.
Exceptions overruled.
On the general question as to the liability of sleeping-car companies for the
property of their passengers, see the
case of Lewis v. N. Y. Cent. Sleeping
Car Co., ante 359.
Inthe case of Tracy v. The Pullman
Palace Car Co., 67 How. Pr. 154, the
rule is laid down that while sleeping-car
companies owe greater duties to their
customers than ordinary railroad carriers
of passengers, still they can only be held
liable for property lost while under the
control of the passenger upon proof of
some fault or negligence upon their part;
and the mere fact of such loss, unaccompanied by any other proof, raises no presumption of negligence : see, also, Welch
v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 16 Abb. Pr.
(N. S.) 352 ; s. o. 1 Sheld. (N.Y. Super.
Ct.) 457 ; Kinsley v. Lake Shore, &-c.,
Rd., 125 Mass. 54 ; Clark v. Burns,
118 Id. 275.

In the case of Kinsley v. Lake Shore,
4-c., .Rd., a passenger on a railroad on
leaving the car in which he was travelling, for the purpose of getting his dinner, at a station, inquired of an employee
in the car whether his baggage would be
safe if left in the car, and was told to
leave it there ; that it would be perfectly
safe. He accordingly did so, and on his
return found that the car had been detached from the train and his baggage
removed to another car. On going to
this car he found only a part of his baggage. No notice of the change had previously been given to him: Held, that
this evidence would warrant a finding
that the missing baggage was lost through
the negligence of the railroad company.
In this case it was also held that it was
no defence to an action against the railway company, that the car in which the
loss occurred was not owned by the de-
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fendant but by a third person, who by
contract with the defendant provided conductors and servants, there being no evidence that the plaintiff had knowledge
of these facts. To the same effect as the
last point see L. 6- N. 4- G. S. Rd. v.
Katzenberger, I S. W. Rep. 44.
,
In every case whether the defendant is
an ordinary carrier of passengers or
sleeping-car company, the passenger is
required not himself to be guilty of neg-

ligence contributing to the loss of his
property. In the principal case the evidence of contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff would seem to be
sufficient to warrant a finding for the
defendant ; and there can, as it seems to
us, be no doubt of the correctness of this
decision.
M&RsHALL D. EwELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of MisstssiTi.
CRUM v. STATE.
The fact that death ensues from a wound given in malice, not in its nature fatal,
but which, being neglected or mismanaged, caused death, will not excuse the party
who gave it; but he will be held guilty of murder, unless it dearly appear that the
deceased's own neglect and want of care, and not the wound itself, was the sole
cause of his death.

APPEAL from Circuit Court, Hinds county.
Indictment for murder.
Wells & Wi liamson and D. S. Fearing,for appellant.
T. Al. Miller, Att'y-Gen., for the state.
COOPER, C. J.-It
appears in evidence that the appellant, on the
4th day of July 1884, shot one Ford, inflicting upon him a very
dangerous wound. Ford was treated by a physician for some days,
and discharged, with a warning from the physician that his condition required great prudence on his part. Ford was imprudent, and
on the 2d of September died from inflammation of the bladder,
which the attending physiciaju states was shown by a post mortem
examination to have been a xesult of the wound. On the trial, the
court, at the instance of the state's attorney, gave two charges (the
first and third) to which exception was taken by the accused. It is
only necessary to state the third instruction, since that announced
the law more strongly against the defendant than the first. It is
as follows: i, If death ensues from a wound given in malice, but
not in its nature mortal, but which being neglected or mismanaged,
the party dies, this will not excuse the party who gave it, but he
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will be held guilty of murder, unless it clearly and certainly appears,
either by the evidence offered on the behalf of the state or the defendant, that the deceased's own neglect and want of care, and not
the wound itself, was the sole cause of his death ; for; if the wound
had not been given the party had not died."
In AeBeth v. State, 50 Miss. 81, an instruction practically the
same as the one here given, in the view in which it was considered
by the court, was declared to be erroneous. In that case the facts,
as given by the court, were that a dangerous, but not necessarily
fatal, wound in the abdomen had been inflicted, the cut penetrating
so deep that the entrails protruded. One Patrick, not a physician,
had administered chloroform, replaced the bowels, and sewed up the
wound. The physician who subsequently attended the wounded
man testified that Patrick's treatment was not good surgery ;
that the wounded man died about sixty hours after the wound
was inflicted, as he supposed, from inflammation of the bowels;
that in his opinion death was caused by the wound; and that
wounds in the abdomen were dangerous, but not necessarily fatal.
On these facts the court said: "If there be misgovernment on the
part of the medical attendant, from ignorance or inattention, this
would form no exculpation if the wound were mortal (Arohb. Orim.
Pr. & P1. 262), but if the wound were merely dangerous, and the
bad treatment the proximate and immediate cause of the death, the
result would be different."
For the proposition that for a dangerous wound, resulting in
death from mismanagement, the party inflicting it could not be held
liable for murder, no authority is cited, either by the court or by
counsel in that case; nor has counsel in his brief in the case now
before us cited one; nor have our own investigations discovered
that there are any. On the contrary, the decisions appear to be
be uniform and numerous in support of the instruction given by the
court below, which is almost a literal copy of the law as given by
Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 8, § 189. We have examined many
of the cases cited by Greenleaf in support of the text, and others
may be found in Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, pp. 717-719. As
we have said, they support the instructions given in this case, and,
so far as we are advised, are in conflict with no other case than that
of AeBeth v. State. The principle of these cases is that one who
maliciously inflicts a serious injury upon another, from which injury, as the mediate but not immediate cause, he dies, is responsible
VOL. XXXV.-47
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for the death. It is a salutary rule, necessary for the protection
of society by the punishment of offenders, and ought not to be
departed from.
Mo Beth v. State is overruled in so faras it announces a different
rule, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
1. The more general rule applicable to
cases like the above is stated in 1 Hale
P. C. 428 : "If a man give another a
stroke, which it may be, is not in itself
so mortal, but that with good care be
might be cured, yet if he die of this
wound within the year and day, it is
homicide or murder as the case is, and so
it bath always been ruled.
"But if the wound or hurt be not mortal, but with ill applications by the party,
or those about him, of unwholesome
salves or medicine the party dies, if it can
clearly appear that this medicine and not
the wound was the cause of his death, it
seems it is not homicide ; but then that
must appear clearly and certainly to be
SO.
" But if a man receives a wound which
is not in itself mortal, but either for
want of helpful applications or neglect
thereof, it turns to gangrene or a fever,
and that gangrene or fever be the
immediate cause of his death, yet this
is murder or manslaughter in him that
gave the stroke or wound, for that
wound, though it were not the immediate cause of his death, yet if it
were the mediate cause thereof and the
fever or gangrene was the immediate
cause of his death, yet the wound was
the cause of the gangrene or fever and
consequently is causa causati."
2. In Corn. v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136, the
court said: "The principle upon which
this rule is founded is one of universal
application and lies at the foundation of
all our criminal jurisprudence.
It is
that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the
natural consequence of his own acts. If
a person inflicts a wound with a deadly
weapon in such a manner as to put life

in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act,
it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result.
Indeed it may be said that neglect of the
wound or its unskilful or improper treatment, which are of themselves of the
criminal act which naturally follow in any
case, must in law be deemed to have been
among those which were in contemplation
of the guilty party and for which he is to
be held responsible. But however, this
may be it is certain, that the rule of law
as stated in the authorities above cited has
its foundation in a wise and sound policy.
A different doctrine would tend to give
immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and* essential safe
guard. Among the conflicting theories
of medical men and the uncertainties
attendant on the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in
many cases of homicide to raise a doubt
as to the inmediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which.
person guilty of the highest crime might
escape conviction and punishment."
3. Where death is the result of a wound
inflicted with murderous intent, the
negligence or disorderly conduct of the
person injured will not excuse the homicide, though death may have been accelerated thereby, or with better care the
injured party might have recovered:
McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434 ; Bowles
v. State, 58 Id. 335; State v. Batley,
44 Con. 537; Corn. v. Costley, 118
Mlass. 1 ; Rex v. Rew, Kel. 26 ; Bish.
Cr. L., sect. 638; Roscoe Cr. E. (7 ed.)
718. But see, Harvey v. State, 40 Ind.
516; Rex v. Johnson, I Lew. C.C. 164.
The refusal of the ivounded person to
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submit to a surgical operation is no
defence: Beg. v. Holland, 2 Mood. &
Rob. 351.
The enfeebled condition or previous
ailment of the person who received the
wound which caused, hastened or contributed to the death will not excuse the
homicide: Corn. v. Fox, 7 Gray 585;
State v. Castello, 62 In. 404 ; State v.
M1orea, 2 Ala. 275 ; Reg. v. Miurton, 3
Fost. & Fin. 492 ; 1 Hale P. C. 428 ;
Bish. Cr. L., sect. 638; 3 Greenl. Ev.,
sect. 139 ; Alison's Or. L. (Scot.) 147.
Nor is it a defence that the one killed was
ill with a disease, the ordinary result of
which is death: State v. Morea, 2 Ala.
275 ; Beg. v. Plummet, 1 Car. & Kir.
600. Nor that he was already mortally
wounded,: People v. Ah Pat,48 Cal. 61.
If death ensued within a year and a
day from some disorder produced by the
wound or from exposure resulting from
it, the person who inflicted it is guilty of
homicide ; nor will it avail as a defence
that the constitution or habits of the
wounded party made him peculiarly susceptible to such resulting disease : Kelly
v. State, 53 Ind. 311 ; Kee v. State, 28
Ark. 155; Corn. v. Green, I Ashm.
(Pa). 289 ; Com. v. Fox, 7 Gray 585 ;
Corn. v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136 ; State v.
Norca, 2 Ala. 275 ; State v. B ntley,
44 Conn. 537 ; N. P. v. Warner, 4 McLean 463 ; Beg. v. Martin, 11 Cox. C.
C. 136 ; Beg. v. Murton, 3 Fost. & Fin.
492. But death from consumption induced by long confinement on account of
a wound, or from erysipelas contracted
by being placed in a bed previously
occupied by another patient, has been held
n Scotland too remote to make the inflictor of the wound guilty of murder or
manslaughter: 1 Burnett 551 ; Alison
149.
It is no defence that under better nursing or a different form of medical treatment, the deceased might have recovered;
or that death was camsed by the medical
man in endeavoring to heal the wound

after the usual course of practice ; or that
death was occasioned by a surgical operation performed with ordinary skill by an
ordinarily skilful practitioner : Bowles v.
State, 58 Ala. 335 ; Kee v. State, 28
Ark. 155 ; State v. Bantley, 44 Conn.
537; State v. Morphy, 33 Ia. 270; State
v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 274; Com. v.
Costley, 118 Mass. I ; Corn. v. Pike, 3
Cush. 181 ; Com. v. Hackett, 2 Allen
136 ; People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236 ;
State v. Smith, 10 -Nev. 106; State v.
Baker, I Jones (N. C.) 267 ; Williams
v. State, 2 Tex. App. 271 ; 1 Keb. 17 ;
Reg. v. Wrest, 2 Car. & Kir. 784; Reg.
v. Minnock, I Crawf. & Dix. C. C. 537 ;
2 Bish. Or. L., sect. 680; 1 Whart. Cr.
L. (9th ed.) sect. 157. But see Brown
v. State, 38 Tex. 482.
But if the medical or surgical treatment was grossly erroneous, or the operation performed was not such as would
be deemed necessary by an ordinarily
skilful medical man, and death was
clearly the result of such malpractice and
not of the wound, the inflictor of the
wound is not guilty of the homicide:
Parsonsv. State, 21 Ala. 300; State v.
Baker, I Jones (N. C.) 267; Coffrnan
v. Corn., 10 Bush 495 ; Reg. v. Conner,
2 Car. & Kit. 518 ; Bish. Or. L., sect.
639. And it seems that if one inflicted
a mortal blow, and another a second and
fatal blow, that the inflictor of the first
blow is not guilty of murder, there being
no conspiracy: State v. Scates, 5 Jones
(N. C.) 420.
When a wound has been inflicted with
murderous intent, from which death
might ensue, and has been followed by
death, the burden of proof is upon the
party inflicting the wound to show that
death resulted not from the wound but
from some other cause : State v. Brisceoe,
12 La. Ann., pt. 1, 433 ; State v. Morphy, 33 In. 270.
CHARLES A. ROBBINS.
Lincoln, Neb.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.
GREER v. YOUNG.
A., a citizen of Missouri, was sued in that state byB., also a citizen of Missouri,
and, while the suit was pending, A., at the request of his attorneys, went to Illinois
to assist therein taking the depositions of witnesses, and, while there for that purpose, was served with a summons in a suit instituted in that state by B. for the
same cause of action: Held, that A. was not exempt from service.
Any defect in the writ, its service, or return, which is apparent from an inspection
of the record, may properly be taken advantage of by motion; but where the
objection is founded upon extrinsic facts, as that the party was exempt from service,
the matter must be pleaded in abatement, so that an issue may be made thereon,
and tried, if desired, by a jury, like any other issue of fact.
ERROR to Appellate Court, First District.

.Dent, Black & Cratty Bros., for plaintiff in error.
Clifford, Anthony & Paulson, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MULKEY, J.-Robert C. Greer, on the 28d of July, 1884, com-

menced an action of assumpsit in the superior court of Cook county
against George Young. A summons in the usual form, returnable
on the first Monday of the following month, was served on the
defendant, and due return thereof made by the sheriff of Cook
county on the same day. On the 4th of August 1884, the plaintiff
filed in the cause a declaration in the usual form, containing the
common counts only. On the 18th of the same month the defendant filed, by his attorneys, a special appearance in the case, "for
the purpose only of moving to quash the writ of summons and dismiss the suit." On the 19th of the same month the defendant
filed a written motion in the cause "to quash the service of the
writ of summons," for the reason, as is alleged in the motion,
"that the defendant is a non-resident of the state of Illinois, and,
at the time of said service, was within the jurisdiction of this court
for the purpose of -attending legal proceedings, and for no other
purpose."
This motion was supported by an affidavit of- the
defendant, showing, in substance, that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were residents of Missouri ; that the plaintiff, prior to
the commencement of the present suit, had brought an action against
the defendant in the Circuit Court of La Fayette county, in the state
of Missouri, "for the identical cause of action for which this suit
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is brought," and that said former suit was still pending and undetermined in the state of Missouri; that, in defending saidt-lastmentioned suit, it became necessary to take depositions in Chi'ago,
and that, under the instructions of his attorneys, he went to Ohicago
for the sole purpose of assisting his said attorneys in taking said
depositionst; that*shortly after the taking of the same, and while
in the office of his attorneys consulting with them as to the probable effect of the depositions, the sheriff made service of the summons
upon him in the present case.
Upon consideration of the facts set forth in the affdavit, the
superior court sustained the motion to quash the service, and entered
an order dismissing the suit, which was affirmed by the appellate.
court for the First District. The case is brought here by plaintiff
in error on a certificate of the appellate court, and a reversal of the
judgment of aflhtmance is asked on a number of grounds. It is*"
first contended that, as the defence was of a dilatory character, it
should have been made at the very earliest opportunity, which it is
claimed was not done. Of the correctness of the rule of law suggested there can be no question, but whether the motion was made
at the earliest opportunity is a question of fact that may be materi..
ally affected by the rules of the court where the action was pending,
of which this court cannot take take judicial notice; and, as all
presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the correctness of the
rulings of that court, in the absence of anything to the contrary,
we are not fully prepared to say that the motion was not made in
time, though it must be confessed the objection is not without force.
However this may be, we prefer to place our decision upon other
grounds. The most important question in the case is whether the
circumstances shown, even if properly pleaded in due time, warranted the court in setting aside the service of the process, and
dismissing the suit. There is clearly no ground for the claim that
the plaintiff or his counsel had any agency in inducing the defendant to leave Missouri, and go to Chicago, for the purpose of having
process served on him in the latter place. In other words, it is not
claimed, nor is there any ground for the claim, that service of process upon the defendant was obtained by any artifice, trick or fraud
on the part of the plaintiff, his counsel, or any one else acting in
his interest. The question then arises, can one who voluntarily
leaves his own state, and comes to this, for the purpose of taking
depositions before a notary, be lawfully served, by reading, with
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civil process while here on such business ? The fact that the plaintiff had sued the defendant in Missouri on the same cause of action
we do not regard as having any bearing on the question, as it is the
settled law in this state that the pendency of a suit in another state
cannot be pleaded in abatement of a suit brought here on the same
cause of action. McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 486; Allwn v. Watt,
69 Id. 655. But, even where the pendency of a suit in a sister
state can be made available as a defence at all, it must, by all the
authorities, be formally pleaded in abatement, which was not done
b.ere. The right of the plaintiff, then, to sue the defendant here,
"was the same as that of any one else having a claim against him.
The ruling of the court, therefore, must be rested entirely upon the
privilege or immunity which the common law has, from a very early
period, extended to parties and witnesses in a lawsuit while attending court, including going and coming. This rule, as found in all
the text-books, and in most of the cases we have examined, is
expressly limited to cases of arrest on civil process. 1 Tidd, (1st
Amer. ed.) 174; 3 Bl. Com. 289, side p. 1 ; Greenl. Ev., §§ 316,
317; 2 Bouv. Dict. 284.
The rule as laid down in the above works is fully sustained by an
almost unbroken current of authority, as is fully shown by the following cases: Meekins v. Smith, 1 H. B1. 636; Kinder v. WilHams, 4 Term R. 378; Arding v. Flower, 8 Id. 534; Spence v.
Stuart, 3 East 89; Moore v. Booth, 3 Ves. 350; _9x parte Hawkins, 4 Id. 691; -Ex parte King, 7 Id. 313; Sidgier v. Birch, 9
Id. 69; -x parte Jackson, 15 Id. 117-120.
The above authorities are also valuable as throwing light upon
the procedure or practice in cases of this kind. The arrest of a
party to a suit by civil process being regarded as a breach of the
defendant's privilege, the usual course was to appear in the cause
in which the arrest was made, and procure a rule against the plaintiff and his attorney to show cause why the defendant should not
be discharged out of custody by reason of his alleged privilege,
upon his filing common bail. The rule to show cause was always
supported by affidavit setting up the fact of the arrest, and attendant circumstances. On the hearing the rule, depending upon the
proofs, was either made absolute or discharged. If the former, the
defendant, upon filing common or nominal bail, was discharged.
And, if he had given special bail, the bail-bond was ordered to be
surrendered and cancelled. Nevertheless the defendant was in court,
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and was bound to answer the action. While, as we have just seen,
the exemption, by the general current of authority, applies only to
arrests, yet in some of the states, notably in New York, it has been
extended to cases of service by summons merely, particularly where
the defendant is a non-resident. Person v. Greer, 66 N. Y. 124;
Matthews v. Tufts, 87 Id. 568.
No sufficient reason is perceived for departing from the general
current of authority on this subject merely because some two or
three of the states have, through perhaps a spirit of comity more
than anything else, seen proper to do so. The mere service of a
summons upon a non-resident when in another state, for the purpose
of taking depositions to be used in an action to which he is a party
in his own state, imposes no greater hardship upon him than to be
served with process out of his own state, when attending to any
other kind of business. In either case he is usually afforded ample
time to prepare his defence, if he has any. Parties thus circumstanced have no difficulty in getting a temporary postponement or
continuance of the causes, when necessary to the attainment of justice, or to avert any serious loss or inconvenience. It is clear that
such a case does not come within the reasons of the rule as laid down
in the authorities above cited. But, outside of this consideration, it
is essential that the party invoking the protection of the rule should
come prepared to show that he is clearly within it. The rule, as
well as the principle on which it is founded, is thus expressed by
Tidd, supra: "The parties to a suit and their witnesses are, for
the sake of public justice, protected from arrest in coming to,
attending upon, and returning from the court; or, as it is usually
termed, eundo, morando, etredeundo." The term "court," within
the meaning of the rule, has received a very liberal construction.
Greenleaf, in section 817, above referred to, thus summarizes the
result of the authorities on this subject: "This privilege is granted
in all cases where the attendance of the party or witness is given
in any matter pending before a lawful tribunal having jurisdiction
of the cause. Thus it has been extended to a party attending on
an arbitration under a rule of court, or on the execution of a writ
of inquiry; to a bankrupt and witnesses attending before the commissioners on notice; and to a witness attending before a magistrate
to give his deposition under an order of court." To the last instance.
given by the author may be added the case of a party or his witnesses appearing before a master to give or take testimony which
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would fall within the same principle. Where a master, magistrate
or other person takes evidence in a cause under an order of the
court wherein the cause is pending, such officer or other person is
the mere instrument of the court, and is subject to its orders. In
legal effect, such evidence is taken before the court. But a notary
public, when taking depositions in one state to be used in a suit
pending in another, can in no sense be regarded as an instrument
or agency of the court wherein such suit is pending. Neither the
notary, nor any of the parties appearing before him, are answerable
to the court for anything said or done while there, the whole matter
being outside of its jurisdiction. Not so with a master, magistrate
or other person taking evidence under an order of the court within
its jurisdiction. In such case all parties appearing before him for
such purpose, if wilfully guilty of any improper conduct, might
summarily be attached, brought before the court, and punished as
for a contempt in its presence.
In taking the depositions the notary performed purely ministerial
functions. He could decide no questions, nor determine any matter
affecting the rights of the parties to the suit, nor was he, as we
have just seen, connected with any court or other tribunal having
the power to do so. Hence he could in no sense, in the language
of Greenleaf, be said to have "jurisdiction of the cause," and
therefore he does not fall within the category of any of the tribunals
contemplated by the rule in question. Looking at the action of
the trial court from another point of view, we do not think it in
harmony with the decisions of this court. The case was disposed
of upon a simple motion to quash the service. The writ, the service and return, as they appear of record, were in strict conformity
with law, but it was sought to assail the validity of the service on
account of certain matters alleged to exist dekors the record, and
set forth by way of affidavit. This we do not think can be done.
Had the defendant been arrested, and it was desired to raise the
question of privilege for the purpose of obtaining his discharge,
then, in conformity with the well-settled practice in such cases, a
rule nisi should have been taken against the plaintiff, as heretofore
indicated, and the question would then properly have been heard
on affidavit, as was done in this case. But no such a case as the
one suggested was before the court. There was simply an attack
upon the service founded upon extrinsic facts. Whatever may be
the practice in states where the code system prevails, it is clear the
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course pursued was not proper. Here the common-law practice
prevails generally, except in so far as it has been modified by legislative enactment, or perhaps, in some instance, by long and uniform
custom. But we are aware of no change in the practice by legislation or otherwise, so far as the procedure in cases of this kind is
concerned. The rule, as recognised here in repeated decisions, and
which is in strict accord with the common-law practice, is, that any
defect in the writ, its service, or return, which is apparent from an
inspection of the record, may properly be taken advantage of by
motion, but, where the objection is founded upon extrinsic facts, the
matter must be pleaded in abatement, so that an issue may be made
thereon, and tried, if desired, by a jury, like any other issue of
fact. If the plaintiff is successful upon such issue, the judgment
is quod reouperet. It is therefore to him a valuable right to have
the issue thus made up and tried. To permit the defendant to try
an issue of this kind on affidavit, as was done, gives him a decided
advantage; for, if he fails, his motion would be simply overruled,
and he would still have the right to a trial on the merits. To permit a party to thus speculate on the chance of succeeding on a purely
technical ground without incurring any risk, and without any compensation to the plaintiff in case of failure, is contrary to the spirit
of the common law, and is in direct conflict with the decisions of
this court. Holloway v. Freeman,22 Ill. 197; .AfoNab v. Bennett,
66 Id. 157; Union Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 90 Id. 56;
Rubel v. Beaver Falls Cutlery Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 282; -Holton v.
Daly, 106 Ill. 131; Hearsey v. Bradbury, 9 Mass. 96 ; Bean v.
Parker,17 Id. 601; Guild v. Richardson,6 Pick. 868; Charlotte
v. Webb, 7 Vt. 48; Lillard v. Lillard, 5 B. Mon. 340.
For the reasons stated the judgments of the courts below are
reversed, and the cause remanded to the Superior Court bf Cook
county for further proceedings in conformity with the views here
expressed.
1. Privilege of Members of ParIiament. principle. The extent of the privilege
-For a long time members of the Eng- has been a question concerning which
lish Parliament have been privileged different opinions have been entertained;
from arrest on civil process during the
sitting of that body. According to Selden the privilege is as ancient as the
reign of Edward the Confessor: see Bolton v. Martin, I Dall. 296, for a state-

and for a long time after its supposed
origin but little can be found concerning
it in either historical or legal works. In
24 Edw. IV., it was ruled that a menial
servant of a member of Parliament,

ment of the origin and growth of the
VOL. X=.-48

though privileged from arrest, might be
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impleaded: stated in Earl of Shafibury's
Case, I Mod. 146. The earliest American case on the subject of privilege to
legislators refused to recognise this case
as an authority for the proposition that
the privilege was limited at common law
to arrest, and did not embrace exemption
from the service of civil process: Bolton
v. Martin, supra, Phila. Com. Pleas
(1788). The court say: "Although it
were fairly to be inferred from the case
that the privilege of the servant was
equal to the privilege of the member himself, yet a case determined at so early a
period, when the rights and privileges of
Parliament were so little ascertained and,
defined, cannot have the same weight as
more modern authorities." From the
language of the statute of 12 & 13 Win.
IIl., the court drew the inference that
prior thereto members of Parliament
were privileged from the service of process out of the courts of law during the
sessions and for a reasonable time eundo
and reueundo, as well as from arrest.
2. Privilege to American Legislators.
-The case reported in Dallas arose before the adoption of the federal constitution. The defendant was a delegate to
the Pennsylvania convention called to
consider the proposed fundamental law
of the coming republic, and while attending its sessions was served with summons.
On the ground that he ought not to be
diverted from the public business by lawsuits which might oblige him to attend
them and go in pursuit of witnesses for
his defence, the service was set aside. In
Anderson v. Rountree, 1 Pin. (Wis.)
115, it is said that the exemption, as ap"
plied to legislators, is the privilege of the
people and of the body,, as well as of the
individual members. See, to the same
effect, Doty v. Strong, Id. 84. There
are numerous statements in the cases to
the effect that in England the privilege
from arrest has always been construed to
include the service of a summons : Junean Bank v. MeSpedan, 5 Biss. 64;
Andersonv. Rountree, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 115,

citing 1 Bac. Abr. tit. Privilege; Tidd's
Practice 257; Dunlap's Practice 92 ;
Holiday v. Rtt, 2 Str. 985, 990.
This position is usually assumed by
the courts which have given a libera
construction to the federal and state constitutions which provide in language
nearly to the same effect that members
of the legislative body of each shall, in
all cases, except treason, felony and
breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in
going to and returning from the same:
Gyer's Lessee v. Irwin, 4 Dell. 107 ;
Anderson v. Rountree, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 115;
Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed. Rep. 387 ;
Dotyv. Strong, 1 Pin.(Wis.) 84 ; Gibbes
v. Mitchell, 2 Bay 406 ; King v. Coit,
4 Day 129. In a few of the state constitutions exemption from civil process is
also provided for. The privilege extends
as well to territorial delegates to Congress
as to senators and representatives, and
includes exemptions from trial in actions
where he who is entitled to it is a joint
defendant: Doty v. Strong; Gyer's Lessee v. Irwin, supra; Gibbes v. Mitchell,
2 Bay 406. As to the last point, it is
held otherwise in Nones v. Edsall, I
Wall. C. C. 189. Though not expressly
ruled, it is strongly intimated, that when
a writ of arrest cannot be issued against
the person because of privilege, his property cannot be attached upon original
writ: Hoppin v. Jenckes, 8 R. 1. 453,
458. Neither can he be served with a
writ of error: King v. Coit, 4 Day. 129.
3. Extent of Privilege as to TimeEnglish and American Rule.-No time
limit is prescribed during which, prior to
the opening of the sessions or after their
close, the privilege shall extend-the
language is "and in going to and returning from the same." In England,
the Court of Exchequer drew the conclusion from all that was to be found in the
books on the subject "that whether the
rule was originally for aconvenient time,
or for a time certain, the period of forty
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days before and after the meeting of
Parliament has, 'for about two centuries
at least, been considered either a convevient time or the actual time to be allowed." The rule is the same whether
there be a dissolution or a prorogation :
Goudy v. Duncombe, 1 Ex. 430 ; In re
Anglo-French Co-Operative Society, 14
Ch. Div. 533. It applies to one who was
a member of the old, but not of the new,
Parliament. The time is absolute with.
out regard to the circumstances of a particular case: 14 Ch. Div. 533. The conclusion drawn by the Court of Exchequer
and followed in the recent case in the
court of Vice-Chancellor HALL is not
accepted in this country as correctly declaring the restilt of the early English
cases and the rules of Parliament. The
question is fully discussed and the disclosures of the journals of Parliament
stated, as well as the' early English cases,
in a very interesting manner by BtAmLE.r, C. J., and the conclusion is reached
that the law of England, at the time of
the adoption of the federal constitution,
allowed only a reasonable or convenient
time, and not a period of forty days after
and before the assembling, dissolution or
prorogation of Parliament: Hoppin v.
Jenekes, 8 R. I. 453. See 1 Story Const.,
sect. 862; Cushing's Parl. Law, sect.
582. The construction put upon the
constitution was that it meant a reasonable and convenient time for each member to go and return from the session of
Congress.
In an earlier case it was
ruled that the "privilege is to be taken
strictly, and is to be allowed only while
the party is attending Congress, or is
actually on his journei, going or returning from the seat of government :" Lewis
v. Elmendorf, 2 Johns. Cas. 222. The
latest case on this subject approves the
Rhode Island case, but goes very much
further than it or the New York case.
The defendant, a member of Congress
from California, started from that state
for Washington to attend the Congress
which convened December 7th, in time

to arrive in Milwaukee,Wisconsin, about
October 21st. He was accompanied by
his family, who remained in Milwaukee
visiting while he was on a hunting expedition in northern Wisconsin, which continued for about ten days. Seven days
after returning therefrom, and while in
Milwaukee, service of state process was
made upon him. It was shown that some
of his family were too ill to travel for a
short time during the stay in Milwaukee,
and that the early departure from California was because of medical advice
concerning the health of some of defendant's children. It was also made to appear that after remaining in Milwaukee
two weeks, he might have arrived in
Washington three weeks before the time
fixed for the meeting of Congress, and
that the usual route from California to
Washington was not via Milwaukee. The
state court refused, without prejudice, to
set aside the service, and the cause was
removed to the federal court, which did
set it aside: Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed.
Rep. 387. See Coxe v. Ml' Clenacan, 3
Dall. 478. The test applied is the good
faith of the defendant ; his purpose,
primarily, in making the journey, must
have been to be prepared to enter upon
the discharge of his duties.
The only cases found which hold that
legislators are not privileged from service
of civil process by virtue of the constitutional immunity from arrest, were ruled
in Texas and Kentucky : Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Tex. 461 ; Catlett v: Morton, 4
Litt. 122. See dictum in Wilder v. Welsh,
1 MacArthur (D. C.) 566. They are
well reasoned and rest upon the ground
that the language of the fundamental law
is not broad enough to include such process.
4. Privilege to Parties--Distincionas
to Residents and Non-Residents.-The
extent of the privilege to parties to judicial proceedings is a question upon which
different opinions have been held. In
some courts a distinction has been taken
between parties who are residents of the
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jurisdiction and those who are not. Some
of the earlier cases do not notice the distinction, and it is not always clear what
the fact in this regard was. In Pennsylvania it was held that there was no distinction between writs of summons and
capias: Hayes v. Shields, 2 Yeates 222
(1797); Miles v. McCullough, I Binn. 77
(1803) ; Wetherill v. Seitzinger, 1 Miles
The last two are cases in
237 (1836).
which the party served was a resident of
the state, but not of the county in which
service was made. See Lyell v. Goodwin, 4 McLean 29, holding that a judge
privileged from arrest is privileged from
service when about to set out on circuit.
To the contrary: Id. 44. The current
of early American authority was against
this view in all actions in which bail was
not required and where the parties were
residents of .the jurisdiction: Hunter v.
Cleveland, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 167; Sadler
v. Bay, 5 Rich. L. 523 ; Hopkins v. Coburn, 1 Wend. 292; Page v. Randall,
6 Cal. 32 ; Blight v. Fisher, 1 Pet. Ct.
Ct. 41 (overruled by Parkerv. Hotchkiss, I Wall. Jr. 269, the opinion in the
later case being concurred in by Justice
TAsNzy and Judge Gitn) ; Catlett v.
Morton, 4 Litt. 122. Some late cases are
in accord with this principle: Schlesinger
v. Foxwdl, I N. Y. City Ct. 461; Jenkins v. Smith, 57 How. Pr. 171; Case
v. Rorabacher, 15 Mich. 537 ; Gentry v.
Grifith, 27 Tex. 461 ; Wilder v. Welsh,
1 MacArthur (D. C.) 566 ; Massey v.
Colville, 45 N. J. L. 119 ; Matthews v.
-puffler, 10 Fed. Rep. 606. The court
say in the case cited from Michigan that
cases may exist where a party to a suit
may be entrapped into attendance for
vexatious purposes, andwhere service of
process may be an abuse to be relieved
against. But any general exemption
from service of process without arrest,
merely because a partyis attending court
awaiting the trial of a cause, is unauthorized by any settled rule of law, and
is not required by public policy. The
Pennsylvania cases are not suppvrted by

any considerable reasoning. In Hayes
v. Shields, it is said that the party's attention to his own business in the suit
depending is distracted by other objects,
and he is subjected to the inconvenience
of attending an action at a considerable
distance from his own place of abode,
contrary to the wise indulgence of the
law. In Wetherill v. Seitzinger, the court
say that in England, and all the sister
states, a party would not be privileged
from the service of a summons. In New
Jersey the court take the position that
the service is not null, but will be set
aside, or the venue arising therefrom
changed, according to the circumstances
of each case.
The proper ground upon which absolute exemption should be rested is that
it is one of the necessities of the administration of justice, and courts would
often be embarrassed if suitors, while attending court, could be molested with
process. Parties might be prevented from
attending and delays might ensue or injustice be done. On this principle the
distinction taken as to the extent of the
immunity between residents and non-residents, as intimated in a late case (Person v.Grier, 66 N. Y. 124). would have
bat little or no foundation. But the rule
established in New Jersey and Michigan
would remove most of the reasons urged
in favor of immunity to resident suitors.
The privilege is absolute when a party
is brought into a jurisdiction, of which he
is a non.resident to defend a suit : Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124; Matthews
v. Tufts, 87 Id. 568; Nichols v. Horton, 4 McCrary 567 ; Massey v. Colville,
45 N. J. L. 182 ; 7unean Bank v. McSpedan, 5 Biss. 64 ; Dungan v. Miller,
37 N. J. L. 182; Brooks v. Farwell, 2
Mcrary 220; Sewing Machine Co. v.
Wilson, 22 Fed. Rep. 803 ; s. o. 51
Conn. 595 ; In re Healey, 53 Vt. 694;
Parker v. Hotchkiss, 1 Wall. Jr. 269
Plimpton v. Winslow, 9 Fed. Rep. 36b;
Halsey v. Stewart, 9 N. J. L. 366. But
if a non-resident becomes a plaintiff, he
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cannot avail himself of it: Bishop v.
Vose, 27 Conn. 1. This distinction is
recognised in Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Wilson,
22 Fed. Rep. 803; s. c. 51 Conn. 595;
especially in jurisdictions where residents
are not privileged. The privilege continues while the party is going to and returning from the trial: see infra : and
applies to persons against whom actions
have been brought in a representative
capacity, regardless of the character of
the defence which may be made : Grafton
v. Weeks, 7 Daly 523 ; and a corporation
officer: Holmes v. Nelson, I Phila. 217 ;
and to one who is a party in interest,
though the action is in the name of
another: In re Healey, 53 Vt. 694.
5. Privilege to Witnesses-Resident
and Non-Resident.-The extent of the
privilege to resident witnesses is a question upon which the difference of opinion
is the same as concerning its application
to resident suitors. In New York resident witnesses are not exempt from service of process in actions in which bail in
not required : Morris v. Bead, 2 Johns.
249; Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381 ;
Hopkins v. Coburn, I Wend. 292; Williams v. Bacon, 10 Id. 636 ; Rours v.
Tuckerman, 7 Johns. 538 ; Jenkins v.
Smith, 57 How. 171 ; Poard v. Rd., 7
Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 70; Frisbie v. Young,
11 Hun 474 ; see note 18. No reason
is perceived why the courts which extend
or deny immunity to a resident party
should apply a different rule to a resident
witness. On the ground that non-residents
cannot be brought into court by process,
and because of the preference of the law
for oral testimony, non-resident witnesses are privileged from service of process
while necessarily in attendance upon
court and while going to and returning
from the place of trial : Sanford v. Chase,
3 Cow. 381 ; Seaver v. Robinson, 3 Duer
622 ; Merrill v. George, 23 How. Pr.
331 ; Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124;
Massey v. Colville, 45 N. J. L. 119 :
Smythe v. Banks, 4 Dall. 329 ; Grafton
v.Weeks, 7 Daly 523; Person v. Par-

dee, 6 Hun 477; Brooks v. Farwell, 4
Fed. Rep. 166 ; Plimpton v. Winslow, 9
Id. 365; In re Healey, 53 Vt. 694;
Atchison v. _4orris, 11 Biss. 191; May
v. Shumway, 16 Gray 86 ; Dungan v.
Miller, 37 N. J. L. 182 ; Brett v. Brown,
13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 295 ; Mitchell v.
Huron Circuit Judge, 53 Mich. 541. A
subpena is not necessary to afford them
protection: Dungan v. Miller, supra,
overruling Rogers v. Bullock, 2 Penn.
(N.J. L.) 516; In re Healey; Mayv.
Shumway; Brett v. Brown, supra; Dixon
v. Ely, 4 Edw. Ch. 557. Awitness does
not lose his privilege as such because he
is also a party: Merrill v. George, 23
How. Pr. 331 ; Mackayv. Lewis, 7 Hun
83 ; Dungan v. Miller, supra; and is
entitled to the same immunity in a civil
suit instituted by the United States as in
a case where an individual is plaintiff:
United States v. Edme, 9 S. & R. 147.
6. Extent of the Privilege to Suitors
and Witnesses.-The privilege extends to
witnesses and suitors in every case where
attendance is a duty in conducting proceedings of a judicial nature. It is not
confined to courts of record, but embraces
all tribunals recognised by law as having
power to pass upon the rights of persons;
as attendance upon commissioners in
bankruptcy: Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.
Y. 568; to the taking of a deposition
under an order of court: Holmes v. Ndson, 1 Phila. 217; U. S. v. Edme, 9
S. & R. 147 ; or of a master in chancery: Dungan v. Miller, 37 N. J. L.
182 ; Bridqes v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. Rep.
17 ; to taking a deposition under an informal stipulation: Plimpton v. Winslow,
9 Fed. Rep. 365 ; to attendance before
a referee: Clark v. rant, 2 Wend. 257;
an examiner : Huddeson v.Prizer, 9 Phila.
65 ; before a register in bankruptcy under
an order; In re Kimball, 2 Bene. 38.
a case of arrest ; before commissioners
appointed to examine claims against a
decedent's estate: Wood v. Neale, 5
Gray 538, a case of arrest ; before a legislative committee to present a claim:
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Thompson's Case, 122 Mass. 428, a case
of arrest. One who goes at an appointed
time with the bonafide intention of having
a deposition taken, is protected, though
he determine not to have it done: Wetherill v. Seitzinger, 1 Miles 237 ; and one
returning from court which he had
attended upon notice from his counsel to
hear an argument : Terry v. Bast, 3 W.
N. C. 63.
Defendants in criminal prosecutions
instituted in good faith are not within
the rule, even after being discharged on
bail: Moore v. Green, 73 N. 0. 394;
or after acquittal: Hare v. Hyde, 16 Q.
B. 394, 71 E. C. L. 373. Neither is a
witness who is in attendance on court,
when charged with an indictable offence:
Bx parte Levi, 28 Fed. Rep. 651 ; nor
one who is bona fide brought into the
jurisdiction on a requisition as a fugitive
from justice: Williams v. Bacon, 10
Wend. 636; Adriance v. Lagrave, 59
N. Y. 110. But if criminal process is
used for the purpose of acquiring civil
jurisdiction the courts will set the service
aside: Compton v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St.
130 ; Bylerv. Tones, 79 Mo. 261 ; U.S.
v. Bridgman, 9 Biss. 221.
7. Waiver of Puivilege.-Wiere parties or witnesses lay aside their character
as such and for their own interest and
benefit give cause for the commencement
of actions against them, they waive their
privilege to immunity, with the only conditions that the trial upon which they are
in attendance must not be interfered with
as the result of service: Nichols v. Horton, 4 McCrary 567. They lose it by
remaining in the state an unnecessary
length of time after the close of the trial
they were interested in : Van Liew v.
Johnson, stated in Person v. Grier, 66
N. Y. 124; Shults v. Andrews, 54 How.
Fr. 380. In England the courts have
given the privilege a large and liberal

construction, as appears from the cases
stated in Tidd'sI'rac., vol. 1, 196; asby
waiting two days after the close of a
hearing before a referee to learn the result: Clark v. Grant,2 Wend. 257. After
a witness is discharged from the obligation of his subpmna, he is subject to process if he remains and transacts business:
Smythe v. Banks, 4 Dall. 329; or if,

during an adjournment of the court, he
leave its jurisdiction on business or pleasure: Rex v. Piatt, 3 W. N. C. 187.
A person who is privileged and is
served with process must move promptly

and set fordi fully the facts which constitute his privilege, or he will waive it:
Matthews v. Puffer, 10 Fed. Rep. 606 ;
King v. Phillips, 70 Ga. 409 ; Pollard
v. Rd., 7 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 70. A general appearance or any act equivalent
thereto is a waiver: Brett v. Brown, 13
Abb. Fr. (N. S.) 295 ; Williams v. XcGrade, 13 Minn. 174; as to give notice
of retainer and demand a copy of the
complaint: Stewart v. Howard, 15 Barb.
26 ; or to obtain a rule to show cause,
where there is knowledge of the irregularity complained of: Green v. Bonaffon,
2 Miles 219 ; or to keep silent and oxe
cute an undertaking : Farmerv. Robbins,
47 How. IFr. 415 ; or to plead in bar:
Randall v. Crandall, 6 Hill 342. It is
not a waiver to give bail: Nackay v.
Lewis, 7 Hun 83; U. S. v. Edme, 9 S.
& R. 147 ; Washburn v. Phelps, 24 Vt.
506 ; Lamed v. Gr.ffin, 12 Fed. Rep.
590. But see Stewart v. Howard, 15
Barb. 26 ; Farmer v. Robbins, supra ;
nor to take steps to remove a cause to a
federal court where a witness in attendance on such court has been served with
process issued from a state court: Atchison
v. Morris, 11 Biss. 191.
J. R. B~nnvmx.
Madison, Wis.
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Court of Chancery of N7ew Jersey.
FREDERICK B. MANDEVILLE v. GEORGE W. HARMAN.
Contracts in restraint of trade are invalid, and this is so even when the restraint
imposed is partial, unless the restraint be reasonable.
The test to be applied, in determining whether a restraint is reasonable or not, is
to consider whether the restraint is only such as is necessary to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is given, and not so large as to
interfere with the interest of the public.
The question whether a restraint, which is to endure during the life of the promisor or covenantor, is reasonable or not, is an undecided question in New Jersey,
and such a restraint is not, therefore, enforceable by injunction.
A complainant is not entitled to a preliminary injunction when the right on which
he founds his claim is, as a matter of law, unsettled.

ON application for an injunction, beard on bill and affidavit and
answer and affidavit and order to show cause.
Mfr. Joseph Coult, for complainant.
Mr. John B?. Emnery, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN FLEET, V. C.-This is a'n application for an injunction to

restrain the defendant from violating his covenant. The litigants
are physicians. The bill says that the complainant, by many years'
practice and diligent attention to business, has succeeded in acquiring a large and profitable practice, and that in the early part of
1885 his practice became so large as to render it necessary for him
to employ an assistant, and that the defendant became his assistant,
under a written contract, executed under seal, on the 22d day of
April 1885. By the contract the defendant bound himself to devote
his time and attention to the business of the complainant, and to
give thereto all his skill and ability for the period of three months,
at a compensation of $125, and the one-fourth of such sum as the
complainant's income from his practice, for the three months that
the defendant was to serve him, should exceed his average income
for the months of July, August and September in the three preceding years. The contract gave the complainant the option, on
the expiration of the first three months, to extend the defendant's
term of service, at the same rate of compensation, to the 22d of
April 1886. The complainant exercised this option, and the
defendant continued to serve under the agreement until the 22d of
April 1886. On that day a further written agreement was made
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and endorsed on the original agreement, by which the defendant's
term of service was extended until October 1st 1886, and his compensation was raised to $300, and it was also agreed that he should
receive the fees for examining applicants for insurance in a certain
life insurance company, provided they did not exceed $50. By the
last clause of the original agreement the defendant made the following covenant: "In consideration of this contract, made with
him by the said Mandeville, the said Harman hereby covenants and
agrees not to engage in the practice of medicine or surgery in the
city of Newark at any time hereafter."
The defendant has recently, and since the 1st of October 1886,
rented an office in the city of Newark, and put out a sign as a
physician. By his answer he admits that he intends to establish
himself in practice there. The complainant asks that an injunction
issue restraining him from doing so. The defendant resists the
application on two grounds ; first, that the covenant is unreasonable,
and therefore void; and second, that it is unenforceable in equity
because it is not supported by an adequate consideration.
The covenant under consideration is a contract in restraint of
trade. Such is the designation uhiversally applied to such engagements. And no principle of law is more generally recognised than
that a contract which precludes a person from the right to employ
his talents, his industry or his capital in any useful undertaking, is
void. Whether the restrain be general or partial, Mr. Justice
BRoNSoN says, the law starts out with the presumption that a contract in restraint of trade is void, and it is only by showing that the
contract is good that this presumption will be rebutted. The rule is,
not that a limited restraint is good, but that it may be good. It is
valid when the restraint is reasonable, and the restraint is reasonable when it imposes no shackle upon the one party which is not
beneficial to the other. Boss v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166. The
authorities are uniform that such contracts are valid when the
restraint they impose is reasonable, and the test to be applied in
determining whether the restraint is reasonable or not, prescribed
by Chief Justice TINDAL, in Borner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735,
and uniformly adopted in subsequent cases, is this : to consider
whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to
the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so
large as to interfere with the interest of the public. Whatever
restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party can be
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of no benefit to either. It can only be oppressive, and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable and void, on the
ground of public policy, as being injurious to the interests of the
public. The rule, as thus stated, is the law of this state. Chief
Justice .BEASLEY, in pronouncing the judgment of the Court of
Errors and Appeals, in Brewer v. Marshal, 4 C. E. Gr. 537, said:
"' And so far has this principle (that contracts in restraint of trade
are void) been carried, that even in cases in which the restraint
sought to be imposed is only partial, it has been repeatedly held that
such agreement will be void unless it be reasonable, and that no such
agreement can be reasonable in which the restraint imposed on the
one party is larger than is necessary for the protection of the other."
This is the rule by which the validity of the covenant on which the
complainant relies must be tried.
The fault imputed to the covenant is that the restriction which it
imposes is to endure for an unreasonable period of time-for a much
longer period than will be necessary for the protection of the complainant. It interdicts the defendant, it will be observed, from
practising medicine or surgery in the city of Newark at any time
hereafter. The restraint covers the whole period of the defendant's
life, and if an injunction is awarded enforcing the covenant according to its terms, the defendant can never, at any time hereafter, practice his profession in the city of Newark, though the complainant may, the next year, or even the next month, after the
injunction issues, lose his life or his reason, or remove to another
field of practice. Under such circumstances, the injunction would
give no protection to the complainant-he would need none, and
the only purpose the injunction could serve would be to causelessly
oppress the defendant. The Court of King's Bench, in Hitchcock v.
Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 438, held a similar contract void. The" defendant there had entered the service of the plaintiff, who was a druggist, carrying on his business in the town of Taunton, as the plaintiff's assistant, under a written contract, whereby he agreed, in
consideration of the salary to be paid to him by the plaintiff, that
he would not, at any time after leaving the plaintiff's service, engage,
either directly or indirectly, in the business of a chemist and druggist within the town of Taunton. After leaving the plaintiff's service, the defendant violated his contract; the plaintiff sued him,
and had a recovery. The court, in pronouncing judgment on a
motion in arrest of judgment, by Lord DmqmAN,C. J., said: " The
VOL. XXV.-49
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agreement as to time is indefinite.

It is not limited to such time

as the plaintiff should carry on business in Taunton, nor to any
given number of years, nor even to the life of the plaintiff; but it
attaches to the defendant as long as he lives, although the plaintiff
may have left Taunton, or parted with his business, or be dead.
* * * In the absence of any authority establishing the validity of
an agreement thus indefinite in point of time, and trying the reasonableness of it by the test given in Horner v. Graves, we think
that the restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the
party in favor of whom it is given requires, and that it is therefore
unreasonable and oppressive." Judgment was given for the defendant.
The case was then taken by writ of error to the Exchequer
Chamber, and there the judgment of the King's Bench was reversed.
The reversal was put distinctly on the ground that a restriction, so
extensive in point of time, was necessary for the protection of the
promisee or covenantee in the enjoyment of the good-will of his
trade, and should therefore be held to be reasonable. Chief Justice
TNDAL, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The goodwill of a trade is a subject of value and price. It may be sold,
bequeathed or become assets in the hands of the personal representative of a trader. And if the restriction as to time is to be held
to be illegal if extended beyond the period of the party by himself
carrying on the trade, the value of such good-will, considered in
those various points of view, is altogether destroyed. If, therefore,
it is not unreasonable, as undoubtedly it is not, to prevent a servant
from entering into the same trade in the same town in which his
master lives, so long as the master carries on the trade there, we
cannot think it unreasonable that the restraint should be carried
further, and should be allowed to continue, if the master sells the
trade, or bequeaths it, or it becomes the property of his personal
representative." 6 Ad. & El. 453. This doctrine has been adhered
to in subsequent cases, and is now the established law of Great
Britain. Pemberton v. Vaughan, 10 Q. B. 87; Blves v. Crofts,
10 C. B. 241 ; Atqyns v. Kinnier, 4 Exch. 782.
The legality of restrictions of this kind is put, it will be observed,
exclusively on the ground that they must be upheld as valid, to
prevent the destruction of a property right or interest, called the
good-will of a trade or business. This right or interest, in this
country, is without a well-defined legal character. It would seem
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that it is scarcely possible for it to exist, even in England, where it
has received repeated judicial recognition, except in connection
with a store or shop, or some other permanent place of business;
for Lord ELDON defined it as nothing more than the probability that
the old customers will resort to the old place (Cruttwell v. 4ie, 17
Ves. 336); and Lord CHELM.SFORD has said, concerning it, that
when a trade is established in a particular place, the good-will of.
that trade means nothing more than the sum of money which any
person would be willing to give for the chance of being able to keep
the trade connected with the place where it has been carried on.
Austen v. Boys, 2 De G. & J. 626. Its existence, as property, in
this country has received more decided recognition, in cases involving the disposition and distribution of partnership assets, than in
any other class of cases; but even in such cases it can only exist,
says Mr. J~istice STORY, where the partnership conducts a commercial business or trade, and that it does not exist where a professional
business is carried on by copartners, for in such cases the amount
of business done by each member of the firm depends almost entirely
on the confidence reposed in him personally as a professional man.
Story on Part., § 99. Sir JOHN LEAC H, V. C., in Farrv. Pearce,
3 Madd. 74, held that on the death of one of two surgeons who
were conducting business as copartners, the survivor was not obliged,
in the absence of a contract requiring him to do so, to give up the
business and sell the practice, but that he had the right to continue
the practice, and take all the emoluments arising therefrom.
Professional skill, experience and reputation are things which
cannot be bought or sold. They constitute part of the individuality
of the particular person and die with him. There can be no doubt,
I think, that if the complainant was the most distinguished physician of the city of Newark, and had by far the most -lucrative
practice in that city, and he should be so unfortunate as to die next
month, or next year, it would be impossible for his personal representative to sell his good-will or practice, as a thing of property,
distinct from the office which he had occupied prior to his death,
for any price, and I think it is equally obvious that if it were sold
in connection with his office, the only possible value which could be
ascribed to it would be the slight possibility that some of the persons who had been his patients might, when they needed the services of a physician, go or send there for the next occupant of the
office. The practice of a physician is a thing so purely personal,
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depending so absolutely on the confidence reposed in his personal
skill and ability, that when he ceases to exist it necessarily ceases
also, and after his death can have neither an intrinsic nor a market
value. And if the complainant should make sale of his practice in
his lifetime, it is manifest, all the purchaser could possibly get would
be immunity from competition with him, and perhaps his implied
approval that the purchaser was fit to be his successor, but it would
be impossible for him to transfer his professional skill and ability to
his successor, or to induce anybody to believe that he had.
These considerations make it apparent, I think, that the reason
which induced the Court of Exchequer Chamber to hold a like restraint valid in Hfitchcock v. Coker, does not exist in this case.
There a right or interest existed, which, according to the law of
Great Britain, would, on the death of its possessor, pass to his personal representative. No such right or interest exists here ; at
least its existence is as yet unrecognised in this state by law. No
court of law of this state has as yet decided that a covenant between
professional gentlemen, so extensive in duration as the one under
consideration, is valid. There is strong reason to doubt its validity.
It is one of the natural rights of every citizen of this state to use
his skill and labor in any useful employment, not only to get food,
raiment and shelter, but to acquire property, and I think it may
be regarded as very certain that the courts will never deprive any
one of this right, or even abridge it, except in obedience to the sternest demands of justice. Chief Justice BE.ASLEY, in speaking of
the covenant on trial in Brewer v. Marshall, supra, said that the
restraint which it imposed was general, both as to time, place and
person, and it therefore transcended by far the limits of utility to
the covenantee, and must for that reason be declared void. And
Chief Justice WOODWARD, in -Keelerv. Taylor, 53 Penn. St. 467,
declared that such contracts, if they were not limited to a reasonable time as well as confined to a reasonable space, were void at law.
He said, also, that if the terms they imposed were at all hard, equity
would not enforce them. Vice-Chancellor SHADWELL had previously
given expression to the same view in Ximberley v. Jennings,6 Sim.
340. Besides, no one can fail to see that if this covenant is valid
and enforceable in equity, then it is competent for every merchant
and trader, when he employs a clerk or shop-girl, to require them,
although the compensation he agrees to pay is no greater than that
which is customarily paid for such service, to enter into a covenant
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that on quitting his service, they will not, at any time afterwards,
accept like employment from any other merchant or trader in the
same town or city, and that if such covenants are made and are subsequently broken, it will be the duty of this court to enforce them,
though the consequence may be that a citizen will thereby be deprived of his only means of supporting himself and his family. It
may well be doubted, I think, whether legal rules producing such
consequences will ever be established merely by force of judicial
action.
The conspicuous defect of the complainant's case is that the legal
right on which he founds his claim to an injunction is not clear. No
court of this state has ever declared that a covenant like that on
which the complainant rests his claim is valid ; on the contrary, it
appears that the general legal presumption is against the validity
of such covenants. In this posture of affairs, the duty of the court
is plain; for, in the language of Chief Justice BEASLEY, no rule
of equity is better settled than the doctrine that a complainant is
not in a position to ask for a preliminary injunction when the right
on which he founds his claim is, as a matter of law, unsettled:
Citizens'Coach Co. v. Camden Horse Bd., 2 Stew. Eq. 299, 804.
My judgment being for the defendant on the first ground taken
by him, it is not necessary to express an opinion on the second.
An injunction must be denied.
The good-will of a surgeon, it has been
held, survives, to his partner: Farr v.
Pearce, 3 Madd. 75; see 14 Am. L.
Reg. (N. S.) 1, 329, 649, 713 ; and how
its value is estimated: Austen v. Boys,
2 De G. & J. 626 ; see s. c., 3 Jar. (N.
S.) 1284, 4 Id. 719; Mellersh v. Kee,
24 Beav. 453 ; Rammeisburg v. Mitchell,
29 Ohio St. 22.
It may be assigned : Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L. T. (N. S.) 335 ; Englandv.
Downs, 6 Beav. 269 ; Drake v. Dodsworth, 4 Kan. 159 ; Guerand v. Daudelet,
32 Md. 561 ; fedge v. Lowe, 47 Ia. 137;
Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200; Morgan
v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517 ; Roller v.
Ott, 14 Kan. 609 ; see Candlerv. Candler, 2 Jac. 225 ; Thornbury v. Bevill, I
Y. & C., Ch. 554; Elves v. Crofts, 10
C. B. 241; Jerome v. Bigelow, 66 Ill.

452 ; Holmes v. Caldwell, 8 Rich. 247 ;
or released: Gompers v. Rochester, 56
Penn. St. 194.
Physicians' and surgeons' contracts not
to practice their professions have been
held valid in the following instances : for
fourteen years, within ten miles: Davis
v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118; at any time,
within seven miles : Sainterv. Ferguson,
7 C. B. 716; at any time, within two
and a half miles: Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4
Excb. 776; at W., or within twelve
miles thereof, without plaintiff's consent,
during plaintiff's lifetime, or within ten
years after his decease: Fox v. Scard, 33
Beav. 327 ; so long as R. G., or his-successors, should carry on business at N.,
or within ten miles thereof: Gravely v.
Barnard,43 L. J. (Ch.) 659; s. 0., L.
R., 18 Eq. 518; an action on the case
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for fraud was held to lie by the purchaser
of a physician's practice, who had represented himself to be a regular practitioner, and evidence to show that it was
irregular and eclecticwas held admissible:
Bradburyv. Bardin, 35 Conn. 577 ; one
about to remove from a village agreed,
in consideration of $500, to sell defendant his practice, and to recommend him
to his patrons, and to use his influence in
his favor, reserving the right to practice
in the village when called on to do so.
Held, that he could recover the $500 from
the defendant : Hoyt v. Holly, 39 Conn.
326 ; "not to locate with a view of resuming his profession, within a circle of
thirty milesaround T. :" Mell v. Moony,
30 Ga. 413 (approved in Goodman v.
Henderson, 50 Ga. 570) ; a sale of a
house and practice, with a condition" not
to establish, nor to attempt to establish,
a medical practice within the aforesaid
township of Chili, nor within six miles
of" the house : Linn v. Sigsby, 67 Ill.
75 ; a similar sale, with a condition not
to practice in the town or within fifteen
miles thereof, "by himself, agent or
otherwise :" Miller v. Elliott, I Ind.
484 ; a sale of land and a practice, with
a stipulation not to resettle in7M., so long
as the plaintiff should be located there :
Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa 144; a
sale of W.'s "good-will of practice,
* * * said W. to quit the practice in
favor of B.," the purchaser, was construed to include the territory over which
W.'s practice had extended, which could
be established by parol; and that B.'s
failure to pay one of the notes which
made up the consideration could be shown
in mitigation of B.'s damages, but not
as a proof of his abandonment or rescission of the contract: Warfidd v. Booth,
33 Md. 63; a guaranty by the vendor
"that no other physician, for the space
of four years, will establish himself in
this place, as a competitor, unless the
increased population of the place should
warrant it," or unless through the purchaser's fault, and agreeing, in the for-

mer event, to refund the purchase-money,
is valid : Gilman v. Dwight, 13 Gray 356;
a conveyance of the land to the purchaser's wife, by whom the money for the
lands and practice is paid, is no defence
to an action for the vendor's violating his
covenant : Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass.
175 ; an oral agreement to purchase defendant's lands and practice, with a provision that he will not practice in. the
town or vicinity, followed by the payment of the purchase-money, the conveyance of the lands, and plaintiff's entering upon practice there, is sufficient :
Doty v. Martin, 32 Mich. 462; to remove from a city and vicinity, and refrain
from practising medicine in said city and
vicinity for at least five years, was construed to embrace all territory within ten
miles of the city limits : Timmerman v.
Dever, 52 Mich. 34 ; 23 Am. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 50, 52, note; see Carroll v.
Hickey, 10 Phila. 308 ; a purchase of the
obligor's house and of one-half of his
medicines, jars and bottles, and payment
therefor, will sustain an action on his
bond not to settle or continue as a practitioner of medicine within fifteen miles
of P., after a specified time: Yhompson
v. 3feans, 11 Sm. &Marsh. 604 ; a bond
by a physician that he would not locate
himself and practice in his profession
within six miles of C., and in case he
should so locate or practice, he would pay
the obligor a certain sum for each and
every month that he should so practice,
is forfeited if he practice within, although
he resides without, the prescribed limits :
Smith v. Smith, 4 Wend. 468 ; "in the
village of S. or town of S., for five
years :" Mott v. Mott, 11 Barb. 127:
not to practice medicine nor in any manner do business as a physician in the
county of Oswego, at any time after May
1st, 1851 : Holbrook v. Waters, 9 How.
Pr. 335 ; a sale of a house and practice,
in the town for tenyears. and, if required
by plaintiff, to give a bond in $5000 penalty not to do so, will not fix the plaintiff's damages for violation of the cove-
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nant at $5000, where such bond was
never asked foi or given: Amedon v.
Gannon, 6 Hun 384; see Niver v. Rossman, 18 Barb. 50 ; a sale of defendant's
office furniture and good-will, with a stipulation to remove not less than twelve
miles from the place, and never thereafter
to establish himself as a physician within
twelve miles, without plaintiff's consent,
and to use his influence to throw his practice to the benefit of the plaintiff, and
give countenance to no other in that direction:'MeClurg'sAppeal, 58 Penn. St.
51 ; a bond in $1000, conditioned that
B. should not "practice medicine within
five miles of S., in which place he has
this day deeded certain property to T.,"
indicates on its faee that the $1000 is a
penalty, but circumstances showing an
intention that it was liquidated damages
may be proved: Bigony v. Tyson, 75
Penn. St. 157 "not to practice within
a radius of five miles" of a certain
place: Betts'sAppeal, 10 W. N. C. (Pa.)
431 ; nor in the "neighborhood :" McNutt v. McEwen, I Id. 552 ; mutual
covenants, by partners, that if A., at the
expiration of the term, should sell out his
real estate, &e., to B., he would not settle himself in practice within twenty miles
of B. ; and that B., if he did not buy
A. out, would not settle himself in practice within ten miles of A., are binding:
Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176.
As to similar contracts between dentists : see Mallan v. .May, 11 M. & W.
653; Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 ;
Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175 ; Clark
v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188 ; see Alcock v.
Giberton, 5 Duer 76 ; and druggists:
Hastings v. Whitley, 2 Exch. 611 ; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Q. B.438 ; Hayward v.
Young, 2 Chit. 407 ; Price v. Green, 16
M. & W. 346; Ward v. Hogan, 11 Abb.
N. C. 478 ; Baker v. Cordon, 86 N. C.
116; and undertakers: Hall's Appeal,
60 Penn. St. 458 ; and grave-stone mak-

ers: Duffy v. Shockey, 11 Ind. 70 ; and
attorneys: Bunn v. Guy, 4 Eat 190
[criticised in Bozon v. Farow, 1 Meriv.
471] ; Nichols v. Stretton, 10 Q. B. 346 ;
7 Beav. 42; Dendy v. Henderson, 11
Exch. 195 ; Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav.
383 [said to have been overruled, Benj.
on Sales,
525; Tallis v. Tallis, 16
Jur. 746, note; I Smith.'s L. C. (8th
ed.) 766 ; Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97
Ind. 69] ; Aubin v.Holt, 2 K. & J. 66;
Howard v. Woodward, 10 Jur. (N. S.)
1123; Galsworthy v. Strutt, 17 L. J.
(Exch.) 226 ; Smalley v. Greene, 52 Ia.
241 ; and school-teachers: Spier v.
Lambdin, 45 Ga. 319 ; and bankers :
Hoaglandv. Segur, 9 Vr. 230; and tavern-keepers: Heichew v. Hamilton, 3
Greene (Iowa) 556, 4 Id. 317 ; Evans
v. Elliott, 20 Ind. 283; Harrison v.
Lockhart, 25 Id. 112; Studabaker v.
White, 31 Ind. 211 ; McAlister v. Howell, 42 Id. 15 ; Stines v. Dorman, 25
Ohio St. 580; Hatcher v. Andrews, 5
Bush 561 ; see Mossop v. Mason, 16
Grant's Ch. 302, 17 Id. 36, 18 Id. 453;
Elliott's Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 161 ; and
barbers :.Burrillv. Daggett, 77 Me. 545;
and photographers:
Baumgarten v.
Broadway, 77 N. C. 8; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; and publishers :
Tallis v. Tallis, I El. & Bl. 391 ; Ingram v. Stff, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 947 ; Ward
v. Beeton, 23 W. R. 533; Conrad v.
Dowling, 6 Blackf. 481 ; Spicer v. Hoop,
51 Ind. 365; Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo.
50; Webb v. Noah, 1 Edw: Ch. 604;
Dakin v. Williams, 11 Wend. 67 ; Beal
v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; and book-binders : Drake v. Dodsworth, 4 Ran. 159 ;
and dress-makers: Iorgan v. Perhamus,
36 Ohio St. 517 ; Morris v. Moss, 25
L. J.(N. S.) 194; and milliners: Shackle
v. Baker, 14 Ves. 468. See further 19
Cent. L. J.62, 81, 202; 1 Smith's L. C.
705 ; 27 Alb. L. J. 24.
JOHN H. STEWAZR.
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Supreme Court of Ohio.
CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK v. BROWN.
Where a certificate of deposit issued by a national bank for $1145, payable to the
order of the depositor, on the return of the certificate, in current funds, is lost by the
payee, and the same has never been endorsed by him, he may maintain an action at
law thereon against the maker, without tendering an indemnity against future lia-

bility.

to the District Court of Hamilton County.
Eugene E. Brown, the defendant in error, brought suit in the
Superior Court of Cincinnati, against the Citizens' National Bank
of Cincinnati, the plaintiff in error, alleging in substance in his
petition, that on the 9th day of August 1882, he deposited in that
bank the sum of $1145, and received from the bank a certificate
of deposit, of which the following is a true copy:
"No. 762. CITIzENs' NATIoNAL BANK, Cincinnati, August 9th
1882. Eugene E. Brown has deposited in this bank, eleven hundred
and forty-five dollars, payable to the order of himself on return of
this certificate, in current funds," which certificate was signed by
the proper officer of the bank. That on the 16th day of September
1882, at Cincinnati, Ohio, he lost the certificate of deposit, and his
pocket-book containing the same, and had not since that time, seen
or heard of either, and did not know where the certificate of deposit
was. That he immediately notified the bank of the loss, and not
to pay the certificate, and that the same had not been endorsed by
him. That he had not, in fact, at any time endorsed the certificate
of deposit; that it was in the same condition when lost as when
received by him; that he had not in any manner sold or transferred
the same to any person; and that the certificate had not been presented for payment to the bank by any one. That he immediately
demanded payment from the bank of the amount of the deposit,
which was by the bank refused, although he offered to receipt in
full for the amount of money, and against the certificate of deposit.
The bank, in its answer, admitted the deposit of the sum of $1145
by the plaintiff, and that he received from the bank a certificate of
deposit therefor as by him alleged; that he demanded payment of
that sum at the time stated in the petition, but failed to present or
produce the certificate of deposit, and informed the bank that he
had lost the same. The bank averred, that at the time the plaintiff
demanded the sum of money by him deposited, it was ready and
ERROR
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willing, and then offered to pay the same, if he would produce and
endorse the certificate of deposit; and in case the certificate was
lost, that it was ready and willing to pay the same on the plaintiff's
executing and delivering his bond with good and sufficient sureties,
to indemnify the bank against any loss that it might sustain, by
reason of the certificate being held or owned by some person other
than himself, and the collection thereof enforced against the bank.
The bank further averred that it was then ready and willing, and
would continue in readiness to pay the certificate to the plaintiff,
upon the execution and delivery of such bond; but that plaintiff
had and still refused to execute and deliver such bond, and the
bank had and still refused to pay the amount of the certificate,
unless and until such bond was executed and delivered for its protection.
The cause having been heard upon the pleadings, testimony and
exhibits, the court found that the plaintiff on the 9th day of August
1882, deposited with the bank the sum of $1145, and received
from the bank the certificate of deposit described in the petition,
duly executed by the officers of the bank ; that on the 16th day of
September 1882, plaintiff lost the certificate of deposit, and has
not since found or recovered the same; that the certificate was not
endorsed by the plaintiff when lost, and that on the 18th day of
September 1882, he demanded payment thereof from the bank, and
although the certificate was then overdue and payable, the bank
refused to pay the same, unless the plaintiff should first indemnify
the bank, against the possibility of loss, by reason of the fact that
the certificate had been lost by the plaintiff.
The court found that there was due to the plaintiff from the bank,
the sum of $1145, with interest thereon from September 18th 1882,
and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff accordingly. "
A motion was made by the bank for a new trial and overruled',
to which the bank excepted. A bill of exceptions embodying all
the evidence given or offered at the trial was allowed, and made a
part of the record. The district court, on petition in error, affirmed
the judgment of the court below, and this proceeding is. instituted
to reverse the judgment of the district court.
-Paxton& WVarrington, for plaintiff in error..
T. Q. Hildebrant, for defendant in error..
VOL. )=X.-50
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The record discloses as facts established to the
satisfaction of the courts below, and which we are not disposed to
call in question, that the defendant in error, on the 9th day of August 1882, deposited with the Citizens' National Bank of Cincinnati, the sum of $1145, and received from the bank a certificate of
deposit for that amount, signed by the proper officer of the bank,
bearing date as of that day, and made payable to the order of the
depositor in current funds, on the return of the certificate. On the
16th day of September 1882, the defendant in errorlost the certificate of deposit, and has not since found or recovered it. When
lost, the certificate was not endorsed by the defendant in error; and
on the 18th day of September 1882, he demanded payment thereof
from the bank, but the bafik refused to pay the same, unless he
would first indemnify it by bond with good and sufficient sureties,
against any loss which it might suffer by reason of the certificate
being held or owned by some person, other than himself, who would
seek to enforce against the bank the collection thereof.
The certificate was in effect a promissory note. It possessed all
the requisites of a negotiable promissory note, and as such, was
governed by the rules and principles applicable to that class of
paper. In Howe v. .Hartness, 11 Ohio St. 449, it was held that a
certificate of deposit substantially the same as that under consideration, was a negotiable promissory note. And in Miller v. Austen,
13 How. (U. S.) 218, where the amount deposited with the bank
was payable only to the order of the depositor, at a future day certain, upon the return of the certificate of deposit, it was recognised
as the established doctrine, that a promise to deliver or to be accountable for so much money is a good bill or note; that the sum
named in the certificate issued being certain and the promise direct,
every reason existed why the endorser of the paper should be held
responsible to his endorsee, that could prevail in cases where the
paper endorsed is in the ordinary form of a promissory note; and
that as such note, the state courts generally had treated certificates
of deposit payable to order. The fact that the money deposited
with the plaintiff in error was made payable on return of the certificate, was not such a contingency as affected the negotiable character of the instrument: Runt v. Divine, 37 Ill. 137; Smilie v.
v. Stevenis, 39 Vt. 315; Bellows Falls Bank v. Rutland County
Bank, 40 Id. 377.
DICKMAN,
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In the view which we take of the case before us, it becomes unnecessary to inquire whether the certificate was overdue and payable
at the time of its loss, or whether a demand before the loss of the
certificate was an essential pre-requisite to the maturity of the
instrument, in order to determine whether one who should come
into possession of it, would be subject to the equities that might
exist between the bank and the depositor, and whether the bank
would be secure in paying the amount of the certificate to the depositor, without exacting from him an indemnity. The certificate
though negotiable was unnegotiable when lost by the payee. It
was never endorsed by him, and it becomes a subject of inquiry,
whether in such case, a bond of indemnity to the bank was a condition precedent to his right of recovery at law on the lost instrument.
It was said by Lord ELLENBOROUGB in -Piersonv. Hutchinson,
2 Camp. 211, "whether an indemnity be sufficient or insufficient,
is a question of which a court of law cannot judge ;" and by Lord
ELDON, in .Ex parte Greenway, 6 Yes. Jr. 812, "I never could
understand by what authority courts of law compelled parties to
take the indemnity." But the difficulty which courts of law have
found in adjusting indemnities, is obviated in this state under our
code of civil procedure, which settles in the same action the legal
and equitable rights of the parties, altering rather the form of
administering justice, than impairing in any manner the rights of
the parties, whether before denominated legal or equitable: Lamson
v. Pfaff, 1 Hand. 449.
If a negotiable note payable to bearer, or to order, and endorsed
in blank, is lost before maturity, it is right that the maker, upon
paying its contents, should be made secure against being compelled
to pay the same a second time. But when the lost instruinent is
not payable to bearer, or is payable to order and is unendorsed by
the payee, as no legal title in such a case could pass, so as to invest
any one with the privileges of a bona fide holder in the usual course
of trade, no indemnity would be necessary. If one should find a
note negotiable by endorsement, and forge the endorsement, the
holder by this title could make no valid claim against any one,
because the written transfer would confer no title upon him. And
if the finder should not forge the endorsement, his action or demand
of payment must needs be in the payee's name, and the maker
might then plead any judgment already rendered against him on
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the note in favor of the payee, or any payment thereon made by
him to the payee.
Among the exceptions as to indemnity, it is said by an approved
text-writer, that there are some cases in which the defendant can
run no risk, and in which the plaintiff may, therefore, proceed in
a court of equity or law without giving a bond of indemnity; that
is, where the note is not negotiable; and where, though negotiable,
it is payable to order and unendorsed, or has been specially endorsed. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1481.
The reason which permits notes never negotiable to be sued under
the expeditious forms of the common law, in preference to the more
tedious and expensive ones of chancery, applies, says Parsons, in
his treatise on Notes and Bills, equally well to all notes which,
being negotiable, have not been negotiated. The rule as laid down
by Greenleaf (Evid., vol. 2, § 156) is, that if the bill or other
negotiable security be lost, there can be no remedy'upon it by law,
unless it was in such a state when lost, that no person but the
plaintiff could have acquired a right to sue thereon. But, if there
be no danger that the defendant will ever again be liable on the bill
or note, as, if the endorsement were specially restricted to the
plaintiff only, or if the instrument was not endorsed, the plaintiff
has been permitted to recover, upon the usual secondary evidence.
And Judge STORY, in considering the remedy afforded in equity,
and approving the rule allowing a recovery on a lost note at law
where it is not negotiable, states that the same rule will apply if
the note were originally negotiable, where it has not been endorsed
by the payee: Promissory Notes, § 451.
In accord with the rule holding the maker liable without indemnity, where the payee has lost a negotiable note before endorsing
it, is the decision in Thayer v. King, 15 Ohio 242. That decision
was rendered in the year 1846, and it has stood approved in this
state from the day of its announcement. We find no adequate
ground for now disturbing it. The court held in that case, that an
action might be maintained at law on a note payable to order, and
endorsed in blank, and lost after it became due. The reason for so
holding will apply with equal force to the case under consideration.
In the one case, it was deemed unnecessary to invoke the chancery
powers of the c'ourt for an indemnity, as the maker would be protected against a double payment of the overdue lost notes, by reason of their being charged with all equities existing between himself
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and the owner of the paper. And in the case at bar, no bond of
indemnity was necessary,-the bank being protected against a
second payment of the certificate of deposit, by reason of its not
been endorsed before it was lost, whereby no bonafide holder could
invalidate the equities between Brown and the bank. In referring
to the contingency of a double recovery against a maker who has
been compelled to pay lost negotiable paper, which had fallen into
the hands of an innocent holder, who had received it before due.
READ, J., in Thayer v. King, supra, says: "If former payment
or recovery would be a complete bar to any subsequent payment or
recovery, the reason of the rule ceases, and the objection to a recovery by the owner no longer exists. Hence, if the circumstances
of the case are such that the negotiable paper can never be produced for payment a second time, or if produced would permit no
right of recovery in the hands of the holder, no indemnity in such
case being required to guard against a second payment, recovery
may be had in a court of law. Thus, if the instrument be totally
destroyed, or if it pass into the hands of the holder, charged with
all the equities which exist against the original holder, the action
may be at law."
Our attention has been called to leading authorities in different
states, in confirmation of the aforegoing views-all going to establish the doctrine that an action at law may be sustained-without
tendering an indemnity-on the lost note though it be negotiable,
if it appear not to have been negotiated, upon giving the usual
proof necessary to let in parol evidence of a written contract.
In New York, before the enactment of provisions securing the
action at law upon lost negotiable paper, upon tendering a bond of
indemnity, it was said in .Pintard v. Tackington, 10 Johns. 104,
that the cases which have not permitted a recovery at law, upon
negotiable paper which was merely lost, were those in which the
paper had been endorsed before it was lost. And where a plaintiff
declared on a promissory note payable on demand, and stated that
the note had been lost, and the existence and contents of the note
were proved, and it not appearing that the note was negotiable, or
if negotiable, that it had in fact been negotiated, it was held that
he was entitled to recover on the note. See also Rowley v. Ball,
3 Cowen 303; Mc-Nair v. Gilbert, 3 Wend. 344.
In Rogers v. Miller, 4 Scam. 333, the court say, that where the
note has not been endorsed at all, or has *been specially endorsed,
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there, as no danger can arise of its falling into the hands of a bona
fide holder, and thus fastening upon the maker a second liability,
the party may recover by showing the loss of the note merely, and
its contents.

In Depew v. Wheelan, 6 Blackf. 485, it was held, that the payee
of a lost promissory note, transferable by endorsement under the
statute, not having endorsed it, may maintain an action at law on
it against the maker. DE.wEY, J., in delivering the opinion of the
court observes, "The note is averred in the declaration to be lost,
but there is no averment, or proof, that it was ever endorsed by the
plaintiffs. There was testimony that if it be lost, it was lost from
the possession of the agent of the plaintiffs. This, we think, raises
a fair presumption, that they never transferred it; and of course
no other holder can show title to it. The makers are in no danger
of a second liability."
In Lazell v. Lazell, 12 Vt. 448, the court pronounces the law as
well settled, that when a note not negotiable, or if negotiable by
being payable to order, not negotiated, is lost, an action at law
may be maintained on the note, on proof of its loss, to recover its
contents.
Aborn v. Bosworth, 1 R. I. 401, was the case of the lost bill of
exchange drawn upon H. and payable to A. the plaintiff, or order,
on presentment. In its transmission to the agent of the plaintiff,
the bill was lost on. board a steamer. In an action against the
drawer of the bill, in which there was a verdict for the plaintiff,
GREENE, 0. J., charged the jury, "If you find that the bill was
not destroyed, you will then determine whether the bill was unendorsed, or so endorsed that no third party could recover upon it.
If the bill had no endorsement, or if it was specially endorsed to
the party to whom it was sent, then no third person can interpose
a claim."
In Jioore v. Fall, 42 Maine 450, the case of Tintard v. Tackington, supra, is approvingly cited in support of the doctrine, that
a recovery may be had at law without furnishing an indemnity, on
a lost note which is not negotiable, or which, being negotiable, has
not been negotiated.
By statutory provision in Alabama, an action is maintainable at
law on a lost negotiable note, which had not been negotiated at the
time of the loss., But in Branch Bank at Mobile v. Tillman, 12
Ala. 214, the remedy by statute was declared to be cumulative, and
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not designed .to repeal or annul all others which were previously
recognised at law. The preamble of the enactment indicates its
true meaning to provide a certain remedy at law, for parties who
might lose the written evidence of any debt or duty,-the necessity
for which is affirmed to be the uncertainty in the decisions of the
courts of the state upon the subject.
It is manifest that the principle underlying the authorities to
which we have heretofore referred is, that the payee or owner in an
action at law against the maker on a lost negotiable instrument,
need not tender to him an indemnity, if the paper when lost was
in such a state, that the maker would not be compelled to pay the
contents again to a bona fide holder. The rule which, we think,
should govern in the case at bar, is in keeping with the decision in
Bolt v. Watson, 4 Bing. 2 73,-a case overruled in England but
not in America, and which in our judgment, commends itself as an
authoritative exposition of the law on the subject-matter adjudicated.
"Thequestion for us," says BEST, 0. J., "is, whether the bill which
the defendant in this cause has accepted, be an instrument which
can ever rise in judgment against him? Now the jury have found
expressly that the bill was unendorsed, and though payable three
months after date, it has not been heard of from 1825 to 1827.
There is no decision in which the party has been held to be responsible in respect of an outstanding bill unendorsed. In all the cases
in which a defendant has been holden to be discharged, in respect
of a supposed liability on a bill, the bill has been in such a state as
to be likelr to be used against him." See Long v. Baillie, 2
Campb. 214 n.
It is contended that the word "payable on return of this certificate," gave the bank the right to hold the depositor to the letter of
the contract, and to refuse payment until the certificate wai surrendered, or until a sufficient indemnity had been offered. We do not
understand that those words import a stipulation for an indemnity
in case of a failure to return the certificate, or to settle the terms
upon which the payee would be entitled to his money, in the event
of a loss of the instrument. Under some circumstances, an indemnity might be properly required for the maker's protection, as, where
the instrument is payable to bearer, or to order, and endorsed at the
time of its loss, while under other circumstances, such an indemnity
might be wholly unnecessary. The words "payable on return of
this certificate," cannot be construed to have an effect beyond what
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might be sufficient for the safety of the bank, upon its paying this
certificate. At the most, the bank should not demand indemnity,
when not necessary to protect itself against a second liability. A
note payable to bearer requires a physical presentation of the instrument before payment, as much as a certificate of deposit " payable
on its return." By the literal terms of the note, there must be a
bearer of it before payment can be exacted. And yet in the light
of Thayer v. -King, supra, it will not be claimed, that a note payable to bearer and lost after it becomes due, cannot be collected
without first producing the note or tendering an indemnity. In
every promissory note, there is an implied undertaking by the payee
or holder, to return it to the maker on payment of the money; and
an express undertaking to return it could have no greater force, nor
change or modify the legal effect of the instrument. As expressed
by PECK, J., in Smilie v. Stevens, supra, "The return of the certificate is an act to be done with the instrument itself, contemporaneous with the payment, and is no more than would be the implied
duty of the holder of a negotiable note or bill, in the absence of
such stipulation ; as it is the duty of the holder to deliver up a
negotiable promissory note or bill, on the payment of it by the
maker, as a voucher for his security, or show a sufficient excuse for
not doing so." An inability to return the certificate, by reason of
its loss, cannot operate as a payment or satisfaction. The maker is
not thereby discharged; but the question arises as to what, if any,
conditions should be imposed upon the loser, before he can recover
of the maker. Having failed to return the certificate, though
required to tender an indemnity in cases where the maker would
not be safe in paying without such return, he should not be required
to go further, and indemnify when the certificate was not negotiated
at the time of its loss, and its non-delivery to the maker would not
subject him to a second payment.
It is assigned as error, that the court below allowed inierest on
the certificate of deposit from the 18th day of September 1882. On
that day Brown requested payment, and the bank refused. It was
incumbent upon him to produce and surrender the certificate, or
give an adequate reason for his inability to do so. Such a reason
was furnished in the loss of the certificate. As the bank, notwithstanding, deemed it advisable to withhold payment, the certificate
should bear interest from the day the bank declined to pay.
Judgment affirmed.

